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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 At best, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment proportion-
ality jurisprudence has been fractured and uncertain since its incep-
tion.1 This has lead to uncertainty in sentencing, as well as questions 
regarding the constitutionality of many sentences. However, with the 
Court’s recent landmark decision in Graham v. Florida,2 the Court 
revived its proportionality analysis and seemingly breathed new life 
into it, enunciating a somewhat different approach to scrutinizing 
sentence constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment. 
 The Court’s approach in Graham focused on three factors for as-
sessing a sentence’s constitutionality: the offender, the sentence, and 
the crime.3 Using these three factors, the Court ultimately held that 
life without parole (“LWOP”) for a juvenile who did not commit homi-
cide is unconstitutional, categorically banning such a sentence in the 
United States.4 And while the holding in Graham is extremely impor-
tant and a step in the right direction, broader applicability of the 
Court’s analytical framework is uncertain given the proportionality 
                                                 
 ∗ J.D., Florida State University College of Law.  I would like to thank my fiancé, 
Kaylie, for her support, love, and patience throughout my time in law school.  
 1. Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 
40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 528 (2008) (arguing that the last twenty-five years of Supreme Court 
proportionality decisions “do not provide practical guidance or a coherent theoretical 
framework for analyzing proportionality challenges”). 
 2. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 3. Id. at 2026–30. 
 4. Id. at 2034.  




principle’s dubious past.5 Therefore, this Note argues that the Gra-
ham decision provides a workable, fair, and robust analytical frame-
work for the Court to apply when evaluating all LWOP sentences 
moving forward. To that end, Part II provides the background and 
context of the Graham decision, so that the underlying theoretical 
and factual bases are well understood, followed by an analysis of the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence leading up to Graham. 
Next, Part III outlines the appropriate analytical framework and its 
justifications, with Part IV addressing potential concerns that may 
be raised contrary to my position in this article. Part V concludes this 
Note with a summary of my analysis.  
II.   GRAHAM: CONTEXT, PRINCIPLES, AND ANALYSIS 
  The Graham Court was faced squarely with the issue of whether 
LWOP for a juvenile who committed a nonhomicidal crime is consti-
tutional under the Eighth Amendment.6 In answering this question, 
the Court focused mainly on its own precedent and the legislative 
posture of the individual states.7 However, for purposes of this Note, 
it is extremely important to understand the history and context not 
only of the Court’s precedent and national conceptions of juvenile 
punishment, but also the underlying principles of juvenile justice, as 
this is helpful in understanding the Court’s treatment of young of-
fenders and the foundational ideas about why an offender’s status as 
a juvenile entitles them to different treatment than their adult coun-
terparts. After explaining these justifications, the factual and proce-
dural background of the Graham decision will briefly be explained to 
properly elucidate the issues before the Court, followed by an analy-
sis of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence prior to Graham.  
A.   Principles of the Juvenile Justice System 
 When the juvenile justice system was first created in the United 
States in the early twentieth century, rehabilitation for young of-
fenders was initially the guiding principle, based largely on the idea 
that juveniles are less mature in their ability to make moral judg-
ments, and that juveniles have the potential for being channeled 
away from further criminal conduct.8 However, as more substantive 
                                                 
 5. Compare, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (forbidding the imposition of 
the death penalty for any individual under eighteen at the time the crime was committed) 
with Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion) (upholding a sentence 
of LWOP for possession of 672 grams of cocaine).    
 6. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.  
 7. It is important to note that while the Court found that a majority of states allowed 
juvenile LWOP for nonhomicidal crimes, the Court still went on to find the sentence un-
constitutional. Id. at 2023–27.  
 8. Since its inception, the juvenile justice system has countered the stark differences 
between youth and adults through “individual assessment and treatment” of children in an 
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and procedural rights have been afforded juveniles,9 juveniles have 
concomitantly been held to a higher degree of culpability, often being 
held to the same level as adults, which is most often seen when mi-
nors are “waived” into adult court proceedings.10 These waivers into 
adult courts carry with them adult sanctions,11 such as LWOP,12 and 
until 2005, even the death penalty.13 But a chorus of scholars is ada-
mantly critical of such harsh treatment for juveniles,14 citing minors’ 
immaturity, as well as their potential for growth into productive, 
noncriminal citizens, as mitigating the need to retributively punish 
youthful offenders.15 Moreover, only fourteen other countries in the 
world allow LWOP for juveniles,16 and the international community 
has condemned the practice.17 But despite such outspoken criticism, 
most states have statutes authorizing LWOP for juveniles: sixteen 
states impose juvenile LWOP as a mandatory sentence for certain 
enumerated crimes18 and nineteen states allow juvenile LWOP on a 
                                                                                                                  
effort to reintegrate young offenders into society. C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the 
Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 
659, 667 (2005); Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without 
Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 685 (1998); Ralph A. Rossum, Holding 
Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America’s “Juvenile Injustice System,” 22 PEPP. L. REV. 
907, 909–11 (1995). 
 9. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1967) (holding that juvenile proceedings 
must, inter alia, comply with Fourteenth Amendment requirements); Kent v. United States, 
383 U.S. 541, 561–62 (1966) (holding that certain due process standards apply to juveniles). 
 10. Logan, supra note 8, at 685–89. 
 11. See id. at 689 (noting that the common perception is that “[o]nce waived into adult 
court, a juvenile offender is deemed an adult, and therefore, the thinking goes, should be 
treated like one”). Professor Logan goes on to say that courts typically rationalize imposing 
adult sanctions on juveniles by asserting that “punishment is a legislative prerogative--and 
that society is well within its rights to impose harsh punishment on juvenile offenders in 
response to their atrocious crimes.” Id. at 722.  
 12. Id. at 689–90.  
 13. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that crimes committed before 
the eighteenth birthday cannot subject an individual to the death penalty).   
 14. See generally Elizabeth Cepparulo, Roper v. Simmons: Unveiling Juvenile Purga-
tory: Is Life Really Better Than Death?, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 225, 226–27 
(2006) (asserting that LWOP for juveniles is equivalent to the death penalty); Hillary J. 
Massey, Disposing of Children: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Life Without Parole 
After Roper, 47 B.C. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2006) (proclaiming juvenile LWOP as unconstitu-
tionally harsh); Dirk van Zyl Smit, The Abolition of Capital Punishment for Persons Under 
the Age of Eighteen Years in the United States of America. What Next?, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
393, 401 (2005) (advancing the idea that basic human dignity should prevent LWOP for 
juveniles).  
 15. Victor Streib & Bernadette Schrempp, Life Without Parole for Children, 21 CRIM. 
JUST. 4, 4–5 (2007).  
 16. Massey, supra note 14, at 1084–85 (citing AMNESTY INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (2005), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/162/2005/en/209dd2da-
d4a1-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/amr511622005en.pdf. 
 17. Streib & Schrempp, supra note 15, at 11-12. 
 18. Id. at 10. 




discretionary basis;19 only nine states and Washington, D.C. alto-
gether disallow LWOP for juveniles.20  
 The vast majority of cases handing down LWOP for juveniles in-
volved homicide committed by the child, often provoking a visceral 
public outcry for the harshest of sentences.21 For example, consider 
the case of Joshua Phillips of Jacksonville, Florida. Phillips, a four-
teen-year-old, stabbed his eight-year-old neighbor, Maddie Clifton, to 
death and then hid her body in the frame of his waterbed for more 
than a week.22 After Joshua’s conviction for first-degree murder, the 
trial court judge told him during the sentencing hearing that “I'm 
certain that on Judgment Day, you, Joshua Earl Phillips, will be giv-
en a far harsher sentence than I can impose.” Adding a biblical refer-
ence, the judge found that, “[i]t would be better if a millstone were 
hung around your neck and that you were thrown into [the] sea than 
to cause harm to a child.”23 Joshua Phillips was sentenced to life in 
prison without parole, with his conviction and sentence both affirmed 
on appeal.24 
 The judge’s remarks are perfect illustrations of the basic, deep-
seated anger that so frequently surfaces when a juvenile commits 
murder, as the offender is no longer seen as a child, but as a de-
praved pariah embodying all of the pernicious traits of a hardened, 
irredeemable criminal. However, while murdering someone, espe-
cially a child, can understandably elicit such raw emotion, nonhomi-
cide offenses fall into a grey area, where the juveniles’ crimes are 
egregious and can certainly evoke scornful emotion, but the child’s 
age and immaturity may mitigate the need for sentencing the of-
fender to LWOP.  
                                                 
 19. Id. Additionally, six other states allow mandatory LWOP for juveniles after cer-
tain other factors are proven at trial. Id. 
 20. Id. at 9. 
 21. Id. at 4 (citing Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (twelve-year-old 
sentenced to LWOP for murder); Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602 A.2d 1308 (Pa. 1992) (nine-
year-old arraigned for murder and sentenced to LWOP); State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340 
(Wash. Ct. Ap. 1990) (thirteen-year-old sentenced to LWOP for robbery-murder). 
 22. Kathleen Sweeney, Joshua Phillips Sentencing, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Aug. 20, 1999, 
available at http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/082099/met_082099maddie.html.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Phillips v. State, 807 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), rev. denied, 823 So. 2d 125 
(Fla. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1161 (2003). The Second District Court of Appeal dis-
cussed and applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment proportionality jurispru-
dence and held that even though “Phillips’ culpability may be diminished somewhat be-
cause of his age . . . the factor of his age is outweighed by his heinous conduct and the ulti-
mate harm-death-that he inflicted upon his victim,” ultimately ruling that the sentence of 
life imprisonment for the specific intent crime of first-degree murder cannot be dispropor-
tionate. Id. at 718.  
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B.   Graham: Factual and Procedural Background 
 The story of Mr. Graham’s life is a sad tale. Born January 6, 1987, 
to parents who were both addicted to crack cocaine, Graham began 
using tobacco at age nine and marijuana at age thirteen.25 Graham’s 
first run-in with the legal system occurred in July 2003, when Gra-
ham and three accomplices attempted to rob a barbeque restaurant. 
Though their robbery attempt was foiled, Graham was ultimately 
arrested and charged as an adult for his involvement.26 While the 
court withheld adjudication of guilt as to the charges of armed bur-
glary with assault or battery, as well as attempted armed-robbery, 
Graham received concurrent three-year terms of probation per his 
plea agreement and was released from jail on June 25, 2004.27  
 Despite Graham’s assertions to the trial court that he intended to 
“turn . . . [his] life around,” Graham was again arrested on December 
2, 2004, for his involvement in a home invasion robbery where Gra-
ham forcibly entered a home and held the resident at gunpoint while 
Graham’s cohorts ransacked the home for money and valuables.28 
The trial court found Graham guilty of armed burglary, and at-
tempted armed robbery, sentencing Graham to “the maximum sen-
tence authorized by law on each charge: life imprisonment for the 
armed burglary and 15 years for the attempted armed robbery.”29 At 
the sentencing hearing, the court explained that “[g]iven . . . [Gra-
ham’s] escalating pattern of criminal conduct, it is apparent . . . that 
this is the way . . . [Graham is] going to live . . . [his] life and that the 
only thing I can do now is to try and protect the community from . . . 
[Graham’s] actions.”30 And as Florida abolished its parole system,31 
Graham’s life sentence carried with it no possibility of release with-
out being granted executive clemency. Graham was seventeen years 
old the night that he committed the robbery. 32  
                                                 
 25. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010).  
 26. Id. During the attempted robbery, the manager was assaulted with a metal bar, 
and so the “charges against Graham were armed burglary with assault or battery, a first-
degree felony carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole . . . and attempted armed-robbery, a second-degree felony carrying a maximum pen-
alty of 15 years’ imprisonment.” Id.  
 27. Id. at 2018. 
 28. Id. at 2018–19. Further, the State alleged that Graham and his compatriots were 
involved in a second armed robbery later that same night, during which one of Graham’s 
accomplices was shot; Graham took the man to the hospital and dropped him off, subse-
quently being arrested after running into a telephone pole while trying to evade police 
officers. Id. at 2019. 
 29. Id. at 2020.  
 30. Id.  
 31. See FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2010).  
 32. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2019. 
 




 Graham subsequently appealed his sentence as unconstitutional 
under the Eighth Amendment, with the First District Court of Ap-
peal affirming the trial court’s decision.33 In its opinion, the interme-
diate appellate court stated that Graham’s original probation sen-
tence was “extremely lenient”34 considering Graham committed a po-
tential life-in-prison felony.  Further, because Graham had person-
ally “held a gun to a man’s head during the incident” and “committed 
at least two armed robberies and confessed to the commission of an 
additional three,” Graham’s sentence was not disproportionate to his 
crimes.35  Following the First District’s ruling, the Florida Supreme 
Court denied review,36 with the Supreme Court of the United States 
subsequently granting certiorari. 
C.   Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence 
 The United States Constitution, through the Eighth Amendment, 
proscribes punishment that is “cruel and unusual”37—applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.38 However, prior to 
Graham, state courts were split on whether or not juvenile LWOP 
was unconstitutional: Kentucky,39 Nevada,40 and California41 all con-
sidered the sentence impermissible, while South Carolina,42 Ohio,43 
and Florida44 each upheld the sentence. And while the federal appel-
late courts had not ruled on the issue since Roper,45 the Ninth Circuit 
                                                 
 33. Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d 43, 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).  
 34. Id. at 52.  
 35. Id. The First District Court of Appeal also addressed the issue of rehabilitation for 
Graham, finding that “[w]hile the United States Supreme Court has noted that juveniles in 
general are more amenable to successful rehabilitation,” Graham had been given a fair 
chance at rehabilitation when he was given probation for his felony crimes as a seventeen-year-
old; the Court held that Graham “rejected his second chance and chose to continue commit-
ting crimes at an escalating pace,” warranting the trial court’s chosen punishment. Id. 
 36. Graham v. State, 990 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 2008).  
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. “The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is 
nothing less than the dignity of man.”  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 39. Workman v. Kentucky, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968) (noting that because it is 
not possible to know whether or not a fourteen-year-old will be able to reform later in life, 
LWOP is cruel and unusual for such a young offender). 
 40. Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 946–47 (Nev. 1989) (overturning LWOP for a 
thirteen-year-old offender, noting that juveniles should be judged by different standards 
than mature adults). 
 41. In re Nunez, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 265 (Cal. 4th Ct. App. 2009) (finding that LWOP for 
a fourteen-year-old nonhomicide offender is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment). 
 42. State v. Standard, 569 S.E.2d 325, 329 (S.C. 2002) (holding that LWOP does not 
violate contemporary standards of decency, and is therefore constitutional as applied to a 
fifteen-year-old juvenile). 
 43. State v. Warren, 887 N.E.2d 1145, 1154 (Ohio 2008) (affirming a LWOP sentence 
for a fifteen-year-old, nonhomicide offender). 
 44. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 54–55 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that LWOP for a 
twelve-year-old does not violate the Eighth Amendment). 
 45. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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previously held in Harris v. Wright46 that LWOP is permitted under 
the Eighth Amendment for a fifteen-year-old offender.47  
 Although the Supreme Court has developed its own Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, prior to Graham, the Court had yet to 
directly rule as to the constitutionality of LWOP for nonhomicide ju-
venile offenders. Therefore, the following two sections explore the 
Court’s precedent and analysis of the Eighth Amendment leading up 
to the decision in Graham. 
 1.   The Proportionality Principle 
 The Supreme Court has struggled to firmly determine whether or 
not the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality principle for 
application to non-capital sentences, and, if such a standard exists, 
how its parameters should be defined.48 First, in Weems v. United 
States,49 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited sen-
tencing a fifteen-year-old to twelve years hard labor in chains for fal-
sifying a public document, because “the mischief and the remedy” 
were disproportionate.50 Upholding this line of reasoning some five 
decades later, the Court reiterated and further enunciated the pro-
portionality principle in Robinson v. California,51 focusing its ruling 
on the proportionality of a certain crime with a certain punishment, 
and stating that although in the abstract a given punishment may 
not be unconstitutional, applied to a particular crime it may well be.52 
 Next, in Rummel v. Estelle,53 the Court held that a state could sen-
tence a repeat offender to life in prison with the possibility of parole 
for minor property theft without violating the Eighth Amendment, 
basically espousing the view that a proportionality analysis did not 
                                                 
 46. 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 47. Id. at 585-86 (affirming LWOP for a fifteen-year-old homicide offender). 
 48. Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons for Ju-
veniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 9, 9–11 
(2008) (discussing life in prison without parole for juveniles). See generally Bruce Camp-
bell, Proportionality and the Eighth Amendment: Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 
(1991), 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 284, 285–95 (1992) (providing in-depth discussion re-
garding each Justice’s treatment of the proportionality principle); Steven Grossman, Pro-
portionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court’s Tortured Approach to Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 146 (1996) (discussing the background and var-
ious opinions applying the proportionality principle). 
 49. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).  
 50. Id. at 379. The Court stated that it is a “fundamental law” that “punishment for 
crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.” Id. at 367.  
 51. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 52. Explaining its rationale, the Court stated: “[t]o be sure, imprisonment for ninety 
days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual,” but applied to 
specific facts it could be, since “one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment 
for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.” Id. at 667.  
 53. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).  




apply to nonhomicide sentences.54 “Outside the context of capital pun-
ishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular 
sentences have been exceedingly rare,”55 wrote Justice William 
Rehnquist. He continued, “We all, of course, would like to think that 
we are ‘moving down the road toward human decency.’ . . . [H]owever, 
we have no way of knowing in which direction that road lies,” con-
cluding that the federal courts must defer to state legislatures and 
their sentencing regimes.56 
 However, three years later in Solem v. Helm,57 the Court found 
that a life sentence without parole for a habitual perpetrator of minor 
property crimes violated the Constitution.58 Despite the seemingly 
identical facts, the Court applied its “deeply rooted and frequently 
repeated” proportionality analysis.59 In arriving at its ruling, the 
Solem Court used three factors to evaluate the proportionality of the 
sentence to the crime: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harsh-
ness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in 
the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”60 If, after weighing these 
factors together, the punishment is “significantly disproportionate” to 
the crime, then the punishment is anathema to the Eighth Amend-
ment and unconstitutional.61  
 However, the Court again changed direction in Harmelin v. 
Michigan.62 The Court issued a plurality opinion with Justice Scalia 
straying from the Solem analysis, applying instead his originalist 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.63 Justice Scalia reasoned 
that the drafters of the Eighth Amendment intended it as a check on 
the ability of Congress to authorize particular methods of punish-
ment, rather than as a guarantee against disproportionate sen-
tences.64 Further, Justice Scalia specifically renounced the first two 
Solem factors as affording judges an inappropriate amount of per-
sonal discretion to influence their interpretations of sentences.65 
Scalia then touted the third Solem factor as having “no conceivable 
                                                 
 54. Id. at 284–85. Rummel was sentenced to life in prison under a Texas recidivist 
statute for his third charge of felony theft after stealing $120.75. Id. at 266.  
 55. Id. at 272.  
 56. Id. at 283–84 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 410 (1972) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting)).  
 57. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 58. Id. at 303. 
 59. Id. at 284.  
 60. Id. at 292. 
 61. Id. at 303. 
 62. 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion).    
 63. See id. at 961–96 (at times discussing the intent of the drafters, as well as historical 
context existing during drafting period).  
 64. Id. at 976. 
 65.  Id. 
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relevance to the Eighth Amendment.”66 However, Justice Scalia’s 
opinion seems to invoke circular reasoning, as he states that the 
Court’s only province is to provide a check on the legislature against 
authorizing “cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or 
customarily employed,”67 while criticizing the second two Solem fac-
tors in part because there is “no objective standard of gravity.”68 
Therefore, Justice Scalia’s position seems to be that the Court cannot 
decide whether or not a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment be-
cause there are no standards, and the Court cannot create or estab-
lish standards because defining a standard inserts the Court’s sub-
jective interpretations; ergo, nothing can be cruel and unusual.  
 In contrast, Justice Kennedy’s separate Harmelin concurrence as-
serted that “[t]he Eighth Amendment proportionality principle also 
applies to noncapital sentences,”69 and that his analysis, using the 
three Solem factors, is the correct methodology for scrutinizing 
Eighth Amendment challenges.70 However, Justice Kennedy also as-
serted that “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require strict propor-
tionality between crime and sentence,”71 but rather “[the Eighth 
Amendment] forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly dispro-
portionate’ to the crime.”72   
 The seeds of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence found fertile ground in 
which to flourish in Ewing v. California,73 where the Court held that 
the Eighth Amendment in fact “contains a ‘narrow proportionality 
principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences,’ ”74 even though the 
Court ultimately upheld Ewing’s sentence of twenty-five years to life 
in prison for the theft of three golf clubs.75 Writing for the majority, 
Justice O’Conner reemphasized the language from Harmelin that 
successful challenges under the rubric of disproportionality should be 
“exceedingly rare.”76  
 As one can ascertain from the decisions leading up to Graham, the 
exact parameters of the Court’s nonhomicide jurisprudence were un-
certain; indeed, the Court had flip-flopped between rules so fre-
quently that the rules themselves were essentially unknown. How-
ever, there existed prior to Graham another set of rules, a set of rules 
that, while newer than the proportionality principle, played a signifi-
cant role in informing the Court’s conclusions in Graham.  
                                                 
 66. Id. at 988. 
 67. Id. at 976. 
 68. Id. at 988. 
 69. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. at 996–1001.  
 71. Id. at 1001. 
 72. Id. (quoting Solem v Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303 (1983)). 
 73. 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 74. Id. at 20 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996-97).  
 75. Id. at 30–31.  
 76. Id. at 21 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)). 




 2.   The National Consensus and Evolving Standards of Decency 
 As mentioned previously, Roper v. Simmons77 eliminated the 
death penalty as a sentencing option for juveniles. In Roper, the 
Court focused its Eighth Amendment analysis on objective indicators 
of the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society,”78 while also examining the differences between adults 
and juveniles in depth.79 Justice Kennedy, authoring the majority 
opinion, employed a somewhat novel approach for evaluating juvenile 
death penalty sentences under the Eighth Amendment.80 The first 
inquiry in Roper was whether or not there existed a national consen-
sus on standards of decency regarding the juvenile death penalty 
demonstrated by objective evidence.81 For such objective indicia, the 
Court looked to (1) the rejection of the practice in the majority of 
states; (2) the infrequency of its use in jurisdictions where it re-
mained on the books; and (3) the consistency in the trend toward abo-
lition of the practice.82  
 After finding a definitive trend nationally and internationally for 
the abolition of the juvenile death penalty,83 the Court then evaluated 
whether or not juveniles’ reduced culpability, increased susceptibility 
to influence, and inability to control their surroundings ultimately 
warranted an absolute prohibition of juvenile execution.84 Weighing 
these factors together, the Court concluded that juvenile offenders do 
not qualify for the narrow category of persons “whose extreme culpa-
bility makes them ‘the most deserving of execution,’ ”85 thereby abol-
ishing the death penalty for juvenile offenders.86  
 But while the Roper Court used the “national consensus” doctrine 
for abolishing the death penalty for juveniles, this concept first made 
its appearance in 1958 in Trop v. Dulles,87 where Justice Frankfurter, 
in his dissent, noted that a century of what he considered objective 
evidence (namely federal practice and the laws of other countries), 
cut against the grain of the majority’s holding, indicating that this 
should strongly influence the Court’s decision.88 Since Trop, the Court 
                                                 
 77. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 78. Id. at 561 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).  
 79. Id. at 568–76. 
 80. See Julie Rowe, Note, Mourning the Untimely Death of the Juvenile Death Penalty: 
An Examination of Roper v. Simmons and the Future of the Juvenile Justice System, 42 
CAL. W. L. REV. 287, 304 (asserting that “Justice Kennedy essentially rejected the Stand-
ford Court’s [previously-established] analytical framework”). 
 81. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565–67.  
 82. Id. at 564–65. 
 83. Id. at 568, 575–76. 
 84. Feld, supra note 48, at 9–10 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70). 
 85. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).  
 86. Id. at 578–79.  
 87. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).  
 88. Id. at 126.  
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has invoked the doctrine on a number of occasions in its Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence,89 sparking considerable debate among 
academicians over whether the Court should use such a majoritarian 
method for its constitutional analysis.90  
D.   Analysis of the Decision 
 Prior to beginning its constitutional exegesis, the Graham opinion 
opens with a brief soliloquy relating the circumstances of Terrance 
Graham’s life: his parents were addicted to crack cocaine, young 
Terrance was diagnosed early on with Attention Deficit Disorder, and 
subsequently began alcohol and drug use at an early age.91 After ex-
plaining the events leading to Graham’s eventual conviction, sentenc-
ing, and incarceration,92 the Court began its constitutional analysis.  
 The manner in which Justice Kennedy arrives at the Court’s hold-
ing is interesting in that he essentially combines two different juris-
prudential concepts to create a third—which is the Court’s ultimate 
ruling. First, Justice Kennedy looked to Kennedy v. Louisiana93 for 
the strict proportionality concept between crime and punishment. In 
Kennedy, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment proportionality 
principle forbids the execution of an offender for the nonhomicide 
rape of a child, finding that the Court must adhere to a rule that re-
serves use of the death penalty only “for crimes that take the life of 
the victim,”94 with the Court in Graham seemingly declaring the 
nonhomicidal nature of an offense as being a mitigating factor.  
 The second prong of the Court’s analysis began with Justice Ken-
nedy stating, “Roper established that because juveniles have lessened 
culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”95 
                                                 
 89. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 562–64; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-16, 321–23; Stanford 
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370–73 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 331, 334–35 
(1989); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987). 
 90. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using 
State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 
1113 (2006) (positing that in taking a majoritarian approach, the Court only enforces con-
stitutional protections where they are least needed); Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexcep-
tionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. REV 365 (2009) (asserting that the Court 
takes a majoritarian approach in other civil liberties contexts, warranting use and consid-
eration of the practice by scholars and practitioners); Michael S. Moore, Morality in Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 63 (2008) (taking the position 
that a right against a majority is no right at all when the same majority interprets such 
right); Richard M. Ré, Can Congress Overturn Kennedy v. Louisiana?, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1031 (2010) (concluding that Congress could possibly overturn the Court’s ban on 
execution for rape by playing to the Court’s national consensus jurisprudence).  
 91. The opening of the opinion seems important in setting the tone for the Court’s 
later use of a person’s individual characteristics and circumstances during constitutional 
evaluation of his or her sentence.  
92. See supra Section II.A. 
 93. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).  
 94. Id. at 2665.  
 95. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). 




The Court then combined the rules from Roper and Kennedy to create 
a third, which ultimately informs the Court’s ruling: “It follows that, 
when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not 
kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”96 This 
method of constitutional analysis may prove to have far-reaching 
consequences, as it seems to somewhat remedy the “tension between 
general rules and case-specific circumstances” that the Court noted 
in Kennedy.97 Under the rationale employed in Graham, the Court 
seems to unify many of its previously disjointed principles of Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.   
III.   APPLICATION TO ADULT SENTENCES 
 Commentary recently cautioned that zealous anti-death penalty 
advocacy may serve to “obscure or normalize pathologies that afflict 
non-capital criminal punishment.”98 However, the holding in Graham 
seems contrary to this assertion, as the Court revived its propor-
tionality doctrine to find Terrance Graham’s LWOP sentence uncon-
stitutional.  But the three variables relied upon by the majority opin-
ion in Graham—the seriousness of LWOP (the sentence), conviction 
for a nonhomicide offense (the offense), and Graham’s status as a ju-
venile (the offender), may ultimately limit applicability of the opinion to 
other contexts, namely in the review of adult LWOP sentences. 
Within this Section, however, I posit that Graham’s rationale can and 
should be applied when reviewing noncapital LWOP adult sentences, as 
the theoretical and factual underpinnings of the factors in Graham 
would seem to support broader application, hopefully unifying the mess 
that seemingly is the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.99  
                                                 
 96. Id. at 2027.  
 97. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659 (citing Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994)).  
 98. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall? The 
Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More 
Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 177 (2008).  The authors posited that the increased 
focus on reducing capital sentencing throughout the U.S. could ultimately result in more 
stringent application of LWOP sentencing.  See id. at 204–05.  
 99. Unfortunately, many assert that the Court’s Eighth Amendment proportionality 
jurisprudence is a “mess.” See Tom Stacy, Cleaning up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 475 (2005) (arguing that the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence “is plagued by deep inconsistencies concerning the Amendment’s text, the 
Court’s own role, and a constitutional requirement of proportionate punishment” and is 
simply a “mess”); see, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court’s Backwards 
Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal 
Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1251-53 (2000) 
(arguing that the Court’s refusal to subject custodial sentences to searching proportionality 
review is incompatible with its increasing scrutiny of punitive damages awards); Steven 
Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court’s Tortured 
Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 107 (1996) (arguing that the 
Court’s proportionality jurisprudence is “confused”); Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating 
Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 528 (2008) 
(arguing that the last twenty-five years of Supreme Court proportionality decisions “do 
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A.   Variable One: The Sentence 
 Arguably, the most important variable to assert in urging the ap-
plication of Graham to noncapital adult LWOP sentences is the 
analogous nature of the sentence itself. In the only successful propor-
tionality challenge before the Court for a LWOP sentence prior to 
Graham, the Solem Court established a somewhat bright line dichot-
omy between capital and noncapital cases, with Justice Scalia’s lam-
basting of proportionality review in Harmelin further driving a divid-
ing wedge between the two classifications, largely because of the 
“death is different” rationale.100 Thus, prior to Graham, the likelihood 
for application of the Court’s proportionality analysis to adult LWOP 
seemed somewhat dubious. 
 However, many commentators assert that the incarceration ex-
perience has become dramatically harsher in recent years: prisoners 
are regularly raped, beaten, and deprived completely of human con-
tact.101 These consequences of incarceration are seen in both the ju-
venile and adult contexts.102 Part of the problem is that prisons have 
been overcrowded for decades, with states unable to keep up with the 
increasing demand for prison cells.103 This overcrowding has led to a 
litany of serious problems, including increased incidents of serious 
inmate violence, as well as the spread of infectious diseases.104 Over-
                                                                                                                  
not provide practical guidance or a coherent theoretical framework for analyzing 
proportionality challenges”).  
 100. “[Prison sentences] cannot be compared with death,” wrote Justice Scalia, stating 
that the Court had “drawn the line of required individualized sentencing at capital cases, and 
s[aw] no basis for extending it further.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991).  
The “death is different” rationale has been a part of the Court’s jurisprudence for decades:  
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in 
degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its re-
jection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. 
And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in 
our concept of humanity.  
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 101. See, e.g., Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane 
Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111 (2007) (discussing the 
various manners in which prisoners are treated inhumanely while in prison, such as: pris-
oner rape, contraction of life-threatening diseases, and physical abuse); James E. Robert-
son, A Punk’s Song About Prison Reform, 24 PACE L. REV. 527 (2004) (biographical article 
of prison inmate who contracted AIDS after being made to perform sexual acts in prison).  
 102. See Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in 
Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983 (2008).  
 103. Carla I. Barrett, Does the Prison Rape Elimination Act Adequately Address the 
Problems Posed by Prison Overcrowding? If Not, What Will?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 391, 391-
92 (2005).  
 104. Susanna Y. Chung, Note, Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth 
Amendment Violations, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2351 (2000) (examining problems with prison 
overcrowding); Peter J. Duitsman, Comment, The Private Prison Experiment: A Private 
Sector Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2209, 2211 (1998) (discussing that 
overcrowding has increased the instances of violence and infectious diseases).  




crowding in prisons has also produced injurious physical conditions, 
inadequate sanitation, and decreased availability of basic necessities 
such as staff supervision and medical services.105 Further, it was 
found that prison overcrowding poses a serious threat to increasing 
prisoner suicide, psychiatric problems, and the number of discipli-
nary infractions.106 Separate and aside from the overcrowding issue, 
current prison practices severely damage inmates not only physi-
cally, but also mentally, creating serious mental disorders and ab-
normalities not present before entering prison.107 
 As the Court in Graham unequivocally stated, “life without parole 
sentences share some characteristics with death sentences,” because 
the sentence “alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevoca-
ble” since there is deprivation “of the most basic liberties without giv-
ing hope of restoration.”108 The Court has recognized that “defendants 
who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are 
categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment 
than are murderers.”109 Therefore, because the austerity and serious-
ness of the sentence itself applies equally to both juveniles and 
adults, the Court should apply the reasoning of Graham to the re-
view of adult prison sentences.  
B.   Variable Two: The Offender 
 In addition to the severity of the LWOP sentence itself, the Gra-
ham Court also examined and expounded upon the implications 
raised by imposing such a sentence on a juvenile.110 The Court ex-
plained that “developments in psychology and brain science continue 
to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,” 
reasoning that because a juvenile mind is still developing into late 
adolescence, a juvenile’s brain is not essentially destined to be and 
remain criminal, thereby indicating that LWOP is too harsh for juve-
niles because of the potential for reform as the offender ages and ma-
                                                 
 105. See Mark Andrew Sherman, Indirect Incorporation of Human Rights Treaty Provi-
sions in Criminal Cases in United States Courts, 3 INT’L L. STUDENTS ASS’N J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 719, 730 (1997). 
 106. Barrett, supra note 103, at 392-93, 400.  
 107. See Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 325, 328-29 (2006) (discussing the mental problems arising in the prison context 
resulting from the prison experience). 
 108. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010). The Court went on to quote a 
Nevada case where a juvenile’s LWOP sentence was overturned, stating LWOP “means 
denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it 
means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], 
he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.” Id. at 2027 (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109. Id. at 2027 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2664-65 (2008)).  
 110. Id. 130 S. Ct. at 2026–33.  
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tures.111 This indicates that the underlying rationale for the Court’s 
analysis is that an offender’s mental state has a significant bearing 
on the proportionality of a given sentence to an offender, which has 
played a significant role in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence in the past.112 Therefore, an offender’s individual actual mental 
capacity is seemingly what the court is focusing on, using numerical 
age as a sort of de facto barometer for mental capacity. Thus, where 
the mental capacity of an adult is on par with that of a child (i.e., in 
cases of mental retardation), and that adult is sentenced to LWOP, it 
follows that a Graham proportionality approach should apply.   
 For centuries, the law has provided an exception for the severely 
mentally retarded, exempting them from criminal liability alto-
gether.113 And while a mentally retarded individual is not per se ex-
empt from criminal liability contemporarily, mental handicap has a 
significant impact on an individual who finds himself involved with 
the criminal justice system.114 For example, many mentally handi-
capped people may be less likely to withstand police coercion or pres-
sure due to their limited communication skills, their heightened sus-
ceptibility to answer questions so as to please the questioner rather 
than to answer the question accurately, and their tendency to be 
submissive.115 One report estimates 6.2 to 7.5 million people with se-
rious cognitive disabilities live in the United States,116 with the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention reporting approximately 1.5 million 
people with severe intellectual disability in the U.S.117 These consid-
erations and others have led some commentators to call for the imposi-
tion of more stringent protections for mentally handicapped offenders.118 
                                                 
 111. Id. at 2026.  
 112. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In Atkins, the Court categorically 
banned the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders as cruel and unusual, stating: 
“[t]heir deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do di-
minish their personal culpability.” Id. at 318;  see also Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins 
Could Mean for People with Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293 (2003) (discussing issues 
with culpability and sentencing of mentally handicapped individuals).  
 113. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331–33 (1989). 
 114. James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 427–30 (1985). 
 115. Anna Scheyett, et al., Are We There Yet? Screening Processes for Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities in Jail Settings, 47 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 13, 
13–14 (2009), available at http://www.aaidd.org/media/PDFs/PeoplewithIDDDinjails.pdf.  
 116. WISCONSIN DEP’T OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, COGNITIVE DISABILITIES IN ADULTS 
WITH SPECIAL NEEDS: A RESOURCE AND PLANNING GUIDE FOR WISCONSIN’S PUBLIC LIBRAR-
IES, 14, 20, available at http://www.dpi.state.wi.us/pld/pdf/sn04.pdf.  
 117. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, STATE-SPECIFIC RATES OF MENTAL 
RETARDATION—UNITED STATES, 1993, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (1996), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00040023.htm. 
 118. See Stephen B. Brauerman, Balancing the Burden: The Constitutional Justifica-
tion for Requiring the Government to Prove the Absence of Mental Retardation Before Im-
posing the Death Penalty, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 401 (2004) (exploring Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudential issues with those who are mentally handicapped); Lyn Entzeroth, Putting 
the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a Na-




 Moreover, mental illness can severely impact an offender’s overall 
mental capacity.119 According to a 2006 study conducted by the De-
partment of Justice, 56% of inmates in state prison, 45% of inmates 
in federal prison, and 64% of inmates in local jails suffer from some 
form of mental illness.120 Similar to mental cognition issues such as 
mental retardation, mental illness can also affect a defendants’ feel-
ings and behaviors, as well as the nature of the defendant’s confes-
sion, and whether or not he even confesses, and, if he does, whether 
or not such confession was voluntary or coerced.121 Interestingly, one 
author discusses research indicating that 94% of homicide offenders, 
49% to 78% of sex offenders, 61% of habitually aggressive offenders, 
and 76% of juvenile offenders have some type of brain dysfunction, 
which can significantly alter an offender’s ability to understand 
and/or control his or her actions.122  
 Thus, while the Court has used an offender’s numerical age to 
categorically reject LWOP for juvenile offenders under a proportion-
ality analysis in Graham, the information adduced in this Section 
demonstrates that the Court should apply the same rationale to adult 
offenders where it is affirmatively demonstrated that the offender 
suffers from reduced mental capacity, whether stemming from intel-
lectual disability or mental illness, as the Court’s rationale in Gra-
ham finds its foundation in mental capacity rather than age.  
C.   Variable Three: The Crime 
 According to the Graham Court, “defendants who do not kill, in-
tend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less de-
serving of the most serious forms of punishment than are murder-
ers.”123 The Court went on to examine its own precedent, further stat-
                                                                                                                  
tional Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 
911 (2001) (evaluating the problems with culpability for those with mental handicaps).  
 119. See James S. Liebman & Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discre-
tion Beyond the “Boiler Plate”: Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757 
(1978). It is important to note that there is a distinction between intellectual disability and 
mental illness: “[t]he mentally ill experience disturbances in their thoughts that may be 
cyclical, episodic, or temporary,” as characterized by disorders such as “schizophrenia, bipo-
lar disorder, psychosis, post-traumatic disorder, and the like,” while “[m]ental retardation 
is not a psychological or medical disorder . . . [but] is a permanent developmental or func-
tional condition. . . . [that] cannot be ameliorated by drugs or psychotherapy.” Entzeroth, 
supra note 118, at 915–16.  
 120. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND 
JAIL INMATES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT (2006), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.  
 121. John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Litigation and the Role of the Forensic Psycholo-
gist, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 73, 82 (2003).  
 122. Richard E. Redding, Why It Is Essential to Teach About Mental Health Issues in 
Criminal Law (And a Primer on How To Do It), 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 407, 417–18 (2004).  
 123. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128. 
S. Ct. 2641, 2664–65 (2008)).  
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ing that “[nonhomicide] crimes differ from homicide crimes in a moral 
sense.”124 And these principles have long been recognized by the 
Court, as evidenced by the Court’s holdings in Kennedy,125 Enmund,126 
and Coker,127 among others.  
 In Solem,128 the gravity of the offense at issue was an important 
factor for the Court’s analysis.  Specifically, the Court enunciated the 
following four principles to consider when evaluating the harm 
caused by an offense: (1) crimes have varying “magnitude[s],” as re-
flected by statutory distinctions; (2) “a lesser included offense should 
not be punished more severely than the greater offense,” thus as-
sault should be viewed differently from assault with intent to kill; (3) 
“attempts are less serious than completed crimes”; and (4) “an acces-
sory after the fact should not be subject to a higher penalty than the 
principal.”129 Moreover, commentators have opined that harms 
caused by an offender’s crime fall into different categories, with 
these varying categories (ranked by severity) warranting different 
levels of culpability and concomitant punishment.130 Other scholars 
have advanced the position that the gravity and severity of the of-
fense in question are fundamental principles that should bare great 
weight in reviving and unifying the Court’s fractured proportionality 
analysis as applied to nonhomicide offenses.131 
  Precedent and commentary make clear that the nature of the ac-
tual crime committed by the offender is an important consideration, 
and one that has, and should continue, to bear great weight on the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis.  The Graham Court’s holding is 
important as it highlights and further legitimizes the use of offense 
analysis in determining proportionality.    
                                                 
 124. Id. 
 125. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2665 (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids execu-
tion for the rape of a child).  
 126. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (finding that the Eighth Amendment 
does not allow imposition of the death penalty for a defendant who aids and abets a felony 
during which murder is committed by others).   
 127. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603 (1977) (holding that the sentence of death is 
grossly disproportionate to the offense of raping an adult woman).  
 128. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).  
 129. Id. at 293.  
 130. Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 
40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 583 (2008).  
 131. Id. at 527. Professor Lee suggests that “[t]he key to resuscitating proportionality 
analysis in noncapital criminal sentencing lies in strengthening the rigor with which courts 
analyze offense gravity and sentence severity,” and that “[p]roportionality in noncapital 
criminal sentencing can be resuscitated by clarifying the theoretical framework already 
contained in Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 583.  




IV.   ANCILLARY CONCERNS AND BENEFITS 
 As with any newly proposed avenue of analysis, critics may cer-
tainly be wary of reviving the Court’s nonhomicide proportionality 
analysis and solidifying a firm base for such considerations.  How-
ever, I think that the benefits of my theory outweigh the potential 
drawbacks, and I will explore two of the possible criticisms that may 
be raised, along with a strong ancillary benefit to my position. 
A.   Concerns Over Increased Litigation 
 At a time when judicial resources are stretched thin and state and 
federal budgets are shrinking, increased litigation may strain those 
resources even more.  Critics may argue that creating a new method 
for potential appeals would greatly increase inmate litigation and 
open the proverbial floodgates with a tidal wave of habeas appeals 
and the like. And it seems that Congress has evinced intent to reduce 
suits by prison inmates through its passage of the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act,132 providing support for such contentions. However, the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act is more narrowly focused on reducing 
civil litigation where money damages are sought, rather than appeals 
of an inmate’s sentence;133 therefore, reliance on that particular piece 
of legislation is misguided.   
 Further, while this Note’s theory may well produce an increase in 
litigation, which would seemingly increase the costs associated with the 
judicial and correctional systems, it seems that if a prisoner’s appeal 
is granted and they are released or have their sentence reduced, the 
state will save the costs that would have been expended in housing 
the inmate.134 Therefore, whereas an increase in litigation may stretch 
judicial resources in some areas, the savings to state governments 
and the federal system would seemingly quickly outpace litigation costs.  
B.   Concerns Over Releasing Inmates Early 
 While in a perfect world every prisoner would be deterred from 
committing future crime after being released from prison, notions of 
such a positive correlation have been attacked and eroded through 
years of quantitative study.  Particularly, it seems that the harsh en-
                                                 
 132. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006) (evincing a strong preference for reducing inmate litigation). 
 133. See Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reduction Act’s Enigmatic Exhaus-
tion Requirement: What It Means and What Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials 
Can Learn From It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483 (2001) (exploring the implications of the Pris-
on Litigation Reform Act).  
 134. See, e.g., Timothy Curtin, The Continuing Problem of America’s Aging Prison Pop-
ulation and the Search for a Cost-Effective and Socially-Acceptable Means of Addressing It, 
15 ELDER L.J. 473 (2007) (explaining the increased costs associated with housing an aging 
prison population). 
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vironments in which prisoners live while incarcerated likely increase 
recidivism rates among released inmates.135 This may be a cause for 
concern among many, as releasing prisoners early seemingly equates 
to increasing crime rates when these former prisoners are rereleased 
into the community.  
 However, it appears that these concerns can be assuaged by point-
ing out two facts, combining them into one rule, and following that 
rule to its logical conclusion: (1) most inmates are likely to be re-
leased at some point in their lives, and (2) increased exposure to the 
prison environment increases likelihood of recidivism.136 Taken to-
gether, these two facts mean that the longer an inmate serves time in 
prison, the more likely they are to reengage in criminal behavior 
when eventually released from prison. Followed to its natural conclu-
sion, this results in the proposition that releasing inmates sooner ra-
ther than later results in a lower recidivism rate. Therefore, any con-
cerns over releasing inmates early based on the analytical framework 
proposed herein should ultimately give way to the conclusion that 
earlier releases could result in lower recidivism rates.  
C.   The Benefit of Decreasing the U.S. Prison Population 
 Severe prison overcrowding has become an issue of growing con-
cern over the past several years as inmate populations nationwide 
have rapidly expanded.137 The problem has been largely attributed to 
the harshness with which sentences have been handed down follow-
ing sentencing policy changes in the 1970s, as state and federal in-
mate populations have tripled, and sentence length has doubled138 
(that is, except for California, where the prison population has bal-
looned by 750%).139 In trying to understand the problem and posit 
solutions, scholars have adduced that there are only two variables 
that affect the size of the inmate population: (1) how many people go 
to prison, and (2) how long they stay.140 Thus, as the overcrowding 
                                                 
 135. See John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Disproportionality: A Spe-
cific Critique of Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71 (2010) (stating that evidence suggests 
that harsh prison sentences increases recidivism); M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do 
Harsher Prison Sentences Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 1 (2007) (explaining that their research adduces no evidence harsher confine-
ment conditions reduce recidivism, and that such conditions seem to increase the likelihood 
of re-arrest). 
 136. See Castiglione, supra note 135, at 78–80 (explaining that quantitative propor-
tionality examines the length of sentence with recidivism).  
 137. Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the 
Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307 (2009); James Forman, Jr., 
Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993 (2010).  
 138. Clear & Austin, supra note 137, at 307–08.  
 139. Amanda Lopez, Coleman/Plata: Highlighting the Need to Establish An Independ-
ent Corrections Commission in California, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 97 (2010).  
 140. Clear & Austin, supra note 137, at 312.  




issue becomes increasingly dire by the day, courts need to develop 
their future jurisprudence with an eye towards influencing these two 
variables to promote a downward trend in the inmate population.  
 The analytical framework developed in this Note fits the bill: by 
examining an offender’s sentence using the three-variable approach, 
disproportionate sentences will be ratcheted down, decreasing the 
amount of time an inmate stays in prison, thereby directly influenc-
ing the second variable discussed above. Lockyer v. Andrade141 pro-
vides a perfect example. In that case, Leandro Andrade was sen-
tenced under California’s “three strikes” law. His first strike was for 
misdemeanor theft and his second and third strikes were for stealing 
videotapes from Kmart, eighty-five dollars worth the first time, and 
seventy dollars worth the next.142 For his crimes, Andrade was sen-
tenced to two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life in prison 
with the Supreme Court, on appeal, finding that the sentence “was 
not an unreasonable application of our clearly established law,” and 
that this sentence was not grossly disproportionate because it was 
not an “extraordinary case” warranting relief.143 Were the framework 
presented herein at work, the sentence would have been found un-
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, and Andrade would 
have to have been re-sentenced to a shorter prison stint.  
 First, the sentence, which amounted to life in prison, would have 
weighed heavily in favor of disproportionality because of the severe 
issues with inmate overcrowding in California and the serious prob-
lems it is causing for the citizens and inmates.144 Next, focusing on 
the offender, Andrade was a serious heroine addict, and he admit-
tedly committed his thefts to try and support his habit;145 this indi-
cates that Andrade’s sentence should be mitigated since his actions 
were strongly influenced by a serious chemical dependency.  Finally, 
stealing less than one hundred dollars worth of videos from Kmart146 
seems to also warrant mitigation under the third prong of the analy-
sis, the crime itself. Therefore, when triangulated and applied to-
gether, the framework posited herein would clearly reduce the 
amount of time served by many inmates, ultimately resulting in a 
reduced inmate population.  
                                                 
 141. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).  
 142. Id. at 66.  
 143. Id. at 77.  
 144. See Lopez, supra note 139, at 97–98 (expounding on the issues associated with 
California’s massive prison population). 
 145. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 66.  
 146. Id. 
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V.   CONCLUSION 
 The Court’s fractured Eighth Amendment proportionality juris-
prudence has created uncertainty and confusion among practitioners, 
judges, and commentators alike. In order to remedy this pressing is-
sue, the Court needs to adopt a proportionality framework that not 
only is cohesive and comprehensive, but also applicable across a wide 
and varying spectrum of offenders and crimes. By adopting the me-
thodology presented in this Note, the Court would not only unify its 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, but would also promote justice 
and fairness in sentencing throughout the United States.  
 
